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BOOK REVIEW
JURISFICTION. By J. Stanley McQuade, LL. B., M.D., Ph. D. 1
Norcross: The Harrison Company. 1982, Pp. 269.
Reviewed by John Rockwell Snowden2
The January 7, 1983, Plenary Session, Annual Meetings of the
Association of American Law Schools, at Cincinnati, Ohio called
for a wide ranging consideration of American legal scholarship, its
current condition and future expectations. An impressive array of
scholars gave talks which have been recently edited and published
as "American Legal Scholarship: Directions and Dilemmas," in the
Journal of Legal Education.3
In March of 1983, a good day, a simple twist of fate, and a
Harrison Company flyer began this reviewer on "The Primrose
Path to Juristic Wisdom ' 4 with J. Stanley McQuade's Jurisfiction.
Professor McQuade and the scholars at the Plenary Session share a
concern for " . . . the intellectual dimension of American legal ed-
ucation.5 While the AALS directed its attention to the work of
practicing law teachers, Jurisfiction is aimed at practicing law stu-
dents. Yet, student and teacher face a similar environment and
look to the same perplexing future.
Jurisfiction asks its reader to consider " . . . thinking and
thoughtfulness and reflection in depth."'6 It argues that it takes
1. Lynch Professor of the Philosophy of Law, Campbell University School of
Law, Buies Creek, North Carolina. Professor McQuade received the bulk of his
formal education in Belfast, Northern Ireland. Before associating himself with
Campbell University, Professor McQuade lectured in Christian ethics, engaged in
the general practice of medicine, professed philosophy, and worked as an
anesthesiologist.
2. Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law, Lin-
coln, Nebraska.
3. 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 403-58 (1983).
4. This is the subtitle of J. S. McQUADE, JURISFICTION (1982).
5. Allen, Legal Scholarship: Present Status and Future Prospects, 33 J. LE-
GAL EDUC. 403 (1983).
6. J. S. McQUADE, JURISFICTION 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as JURISFICTION].
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more than a case of rules and a bag of tricks to be a good lawyer.
In particular, a good lawyer should have some smattering of the
roots and sources of law and the legal profession. Moreover, some
familiarity with the recurring questions of the role and efficacy of
law in society is essential. Jurisfiction introduces these notions by
presenting edited selections from the work of classic jurisprudes:
Savigny, Field, Carter, Austin, Holmes, Oliphant, Pound, Hutchi-
son, Stone, Plato, Bentham, Mill, and Aquinas. Professor Mc-
Quade adds a few notes on several subjects and contributes selec-
tions on language philosophy, prudential theories of justice, and
justice as a practical concept for lawyers.
Jurisfiction takes its title from McQuade's use of fictional vi-
gnettes to introduce the readings. The vignettes are short plays,
lectures, essays, reviews, game shows and even a ballet all created
by imaginary authors. These are intended to introduce a bit of fun
for the aid of learning and to give the reader a preview of the is-
sues to be addressed by the readings to follow. An illustration ac-
companies each of the fictions.7 After each vignette, a few "inter-
locutory injuctions" are used to focus the reader's attention.
The vignettes are silly, and in that, one may find the strengths
and the weaknesses of Jurisfiction. To discuss these energies and
frailties, the directions and dilemmas of American legal scholarship
will be put forward as a context for comprehension. For indeed,
"[ilt is a commonplace that great men impose a burden upon those
who come after them."'
Several of the scholars that gathered at Cincinnati to discuss
the intellectual life of legal education noted a "pervasive unease."9
Legal scholarship was characterized as a great bazaar where many
modes of teaching and writing may be sampled. Yet, this feast
seemed to yield paranoia.
It is a time of rich development, and an inevitable consequence is
that the exponents of every mode of legal writing or law teaching
at times feel either suspicious or under suspicion. They believe
that cold eyes are cast upon them as being in some way either
passe irrelevant, or inferior-either "not real lawyers" or "mere
7. Mr. David Summers is the artist.
8. R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETr 1 (1976).
9. Allen, supra note 5, at 404. "We feel less confident than we did formerly
that we understand our colleagues' judgements on questions of intellectual style,
purpose, or technique. We sense a dissolving accord on what is good scholarly
work." Id.
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lawyers." 0
This bewildering choice of the proper technique of inquiry is
set against a background of skepticism and complexity, the legacy
of -American legal realism." A legacy which leads some to find,
"[i]t is accepted today, virtually universally, that the legal system
can be best understood with the methods and theories of the social
sciences."'" While others conclude that realism has been turned on
its head, that current orthodoxy, process jurisprudence, channels
complexity and neutralizes skepticism.' 3
This is surely ground where angels fear to tread. Enter Juris-
fiction, the fool, the heyoka. ". . . [I]n the heyoka ceremony, eve-
rything is backwards, and it is planned that the people shall be
made to feel jolly and happy first, so that it may be easier for the
power to come to them.' 4
Professor McQuade answers critics who would label his
fictions silly. " . . . [T]hey are, but I am not ashamed. I learned
long ago that if you want to be taken seriously you may have to
become down right ridiculous."' Unfortunately, the majority cul-
ture has few, if any, models for constructive foolery. It is, however,
a valid way of teaching and learning, and perhaps a method of
specification which might stand as an alternative to rationalism
and historicism.
Viewed as a hermeneutic art the fools way concerns itself with
.the embeddedness of action in belief and the clustering of
units of action-belief into totalities whose inner unity is neither
logical nor causal."' 6 The vignettes and their functional authors
open the doors to this way of seeing.
The use of fictional authors makes it easier to be aware of the
10. Hughes, The Great American Legal Scholarship Bazaar, 33 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 424 (1983).
11. Dawson, Legal Realism and Legal Scholarship, 33 J. LEGAL EDUc. 406,
407-08 (1983).
12. Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as
University, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 437 (1983). The law professor who prides herself on
the virtues of a generalist is characterized by Professor Priest as a medieval
anachronism awaiting the Enlightenment. Id. at 440.
13. White, Closing the Circle, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 449, 450 (1983).
14. J. NEIHARDT, BLACK ELK SPEAKS 192 (Bison Book ed. 1961).
15. JUrISFICTION at 4.
16. R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 246 (1976). See Id. at 8-46, 245-62; R.
UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS 106-18 (1975). See generally B.J.F. LONERGAN,
INSIGHT (1959).
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distinction between what is said and what is believed as well as the
tension between actual thought and conduct. Thus, there is insight
to the dialectic of idea and event. This is the realist teaching, more
honored in the breach, to examine tlhe" . . . gap between the dec-
larations and professed ideology of the law and the reality of areas
of social life that it purports to regulate. 17
The fictions themselves argue eloquently for the heyoka meth-
odology. A way of interpreting is to tell a story. Only by telling a
story does one interpret another telling. Consequently, to know a
thing one must do it, at least in the realm of language. This telling
may be done overtly or covertly. It may be acted in the world or
recounted in thought. There is, of course, no assurance that the
telling speaks truly. There is no guarantee of authentic action.
Story-telling fights the general bias of common sense that con-
demns practicality to stagnation, classes, and states. The story may
be "cosmopolis".
What is necessary is a cosmopolis that is neither class nor state,
that stands above all their claims, that cuts them down to size,
that is founded on the native detachment and disinterestedness
of every intelligence, that commands man's first allegiance, that
implements itself primarily through that allegiance, that is too
universal to be bribed, too impalpable to be forced, too effective
to be ignored. 18
Certainly the story fits the aspects of "cosmopolis" that
Lonergan identifies: 1) It is not a police force; 2) It is concerned to
make operative the timely and fruitful ideas that otherwise are in-
operative; 3) It is not a busybody, but ignores the practical thus
engaging in the supreme practice; 4) It purges itself of the rational-
izations and myths that become part of the human heritage before
it arrived; and finally 5) It is not easy, sweetness and light, where
sweetness means sweet to me, and light means light to me.19
If ever a good story were needed, now is the time. You have no-
ticed that the truth comes into this world with two faces. One is
sad with suffering, and the other laughs; but it is the same face,
laughing or weeping. When people are already in despair, maybe
the laughing face is better for them; and when they feel too good
and are too sure of being safe, maybe the weeping face is better
for them to see. And so I think that is what the heyoka ceremony
17. Hughes, supra note 10, at 428.
18. B.J.F. LONERGAN, INSIGHT 238 (1959).
19. Id. at 238-41.
222 [Vol. 6:219
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is for.20
The remarks of Professor Vetter at the Plenary Session were
particularly focused to ". . . suggest the question of how each per-
son's work fit the time at which it appeared."2' And, Vetter may
have anticipated the need for a story when remarking on post-war
legal scholarship (rationalism and historicism), "[it is possible to
say definitely that there is too much of it."2
2
Finally, the scholars longing to associate their methodology
with science or economics, " . . . with a broader base of research
tools,"23 should consider that the story may be, a part of, rather
than distinct from, the "technological continuum. '24 The story was
one of the first tools, one of the first methodologies.
The fools methodology of the story is certainly the strong
point of Jurisfiction. It presents a strong and traditional alterna-
tive to the depleted bank accounts of causality and logic by recog-
nizing another well of knowledge, "seeing the point," the "aha!"
sensation.26 Moreover, because it approaches imagination in ways
not ordinarily described as thinking, but rather surprise or insight,
its emphasis is not gaining, but being. It remembers the road of the
spirit that crosses that of the flesh. 6
20. J. NEIHARDT, supra note 14, at 192-93. The quotation may also lend some
insight to Roberto Unger's KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS. Why would Unger tell a 295-
page story of the antinomies of despair to ask, "Why then do you remain silent?
Speak, God." R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLrIcs 295 (1975).
21. Vetter, Postwar Legal Scholarship on Judicial Decisionmaking, 33 J. LE-
GAL EDUC. 412, 422 (1983).
22. Id. at 412. See generally E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL (1973).
23. Zimring, Where Do the New Scholars Learn New Scholarship? 33 J. LE-
GAL EDUC. 453, 455 (1983). See also Priest, supra note 12.
24. C.E. ATRES, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS 322-23 (New Issues
Press 3d ed. 1978); Weinel, Comment on Rutherford: An Alternative Interpreta-
tion of the Instrumental Theory of Value, 15 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ISSUES 1116
(1982).
25. Heilbroner, The Dialectical Vision, March 1, 1980, THE NEW REPUBLIC 30
(1980).
26. The story may be the origin of "deviationist doctrine," and a way to find
. the mind's opportunity in heart's revenge." Unger, The Critical Legal
Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REv. 561, 576-83, 675 (1983).
Story-tellers, " . . . have used the power they have-the power of
words-to give their ideas the ring of higher truth, and they have
presented themselves as lawgivers and judges of a nobler kind, whose art
moves the hearts and minds of their readers, as no law can, to an appre-
ciation of the ideal of justice."
C. SMITH, J. MCWILLIAMS, JR., M. BLOOMFIELD, LAW AND AMERICAN LITERATURE 36
1984]
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If the story, and particularly the sacred silliness of the fool
that awakens the spirit, responds to the dilemma of methodology
problems remain. Knowing what makes it go and how to drive it,
the destination remains in doubt. Perhaps Professor White had
this in mind at the Plenary Session when he noted that the de-
bates over the "case method" in the late nineteenth century and
the debates over the "functional approach" in the 1920s and '30s
share with current debates the fact that, " . .. the debates are
really about political and philosophical premises." 7
The silly vignettes then must answer to interpretation of sub-
stance and message as well as method. Within the circle of life the
road of spirit is not separated from the trail of laughter and tears.
Though they may go in distinct directions, dreams and existence
always meet.28 If there are weaknesses in the stories of Jurisfiction,
they may be that the stories fail to either transcend or illuminate
the hierarchies of modern life.
Although some, if not all, of the fictional authors share the
virtue of a slightly quirky character, they seem to be far from the
cutting edge of the "terror of consciousness."' 9 There is John Igna-
tius O'Flynn, L., who flunked out of law school and supports him-
self as a "bookie's runner," yet writes plays on legal themes. There
is Michael Joseph O'Houlihan, LL.D., retired law teacher who
gives weekly lectures in jurisprudence in the public houses. There
is Count Nicolai Dimski who devotes his life to the production of a
universal calculus containing every known system of thought in
(1983).
27. White, supra note 13, at 449-50. "The 'crisis' atmosphere in which the
debates are conducted is fostered by the stark disagreements between critics and
adherents on fundamental matters of belief." Id. at 450.
28. The story as the hermeneutical principal drives one in the doing ever
closer to the elusive nature of being. Though this reviewer asserts that epistemol-
ogy and entology, knowing and being, cannot be separated they may be distinct
focii or manifestations. See 2 B. BLANSHARD, THE NATURE OF THOUGHT 260-68
(1939). From the other end, Professor Jerome Hall seeks to influence a method by
arguing for "law-as-action" as the subject matter of jurisprudence. J. HALL, FOUN-
DATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE 175-77 (1973).
29. R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 133 (1976).
When a vision comes from the thunder beings of the west, it comes with
terror like a thunder storm; but when the storm of vision has passed, the
world is greener and happier; for whatever the truth of vision comes
upon the world, it is like a rain. The world, you see, is happier after the
terror of the storm.
J. NEIHARDT, supra note 14, at 192.
[Vol. 6:219
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symbolic form. And, there is the Reverend Samuel McWaddy,
D.D., long-time trustee of the Algonquin J. Calhoun School of Law,
who uses a superficial meekness to skewer his adversary Judge
John Marshall Burghermeister, LL.D., D. Litt., as the good judge
celebrates Law Day.
These characters write vignettes that direct themselves to the
readings that follow in such a way that the issues raised are largely
irrelevant to inquiries which might sharply question the social or-
ganization and consciousness of modern life. With diffidence this
reviewer finds the fictions too gentle with widespread injustice and
hypocrisy. Professor Hughes noted that the legal academic is"...
detached from reality and absorbed in largely irrelevant games
.... "'0 They are a harmless bunch. Like the philosopher they are
tolerated in the legal profession, generally thought to "give tone to
a place," and " . . . since they are generally well mannered and
usually conceive their task as being to furnish analytical and ideo-
logical support for liberal constitutionalism, they can easily be
absorbed."31
As Robert Stevens pointed out at the Plenary Session, "
we are all prisoners of our structures. '3 2 Nevertheless, it may be
the story teller that has the best chance to break free of the "re-
production of hierarchy"33 and the "ordinary religion"" of the law
school and the legal profession.35 Jurisprudence, after all, is for
many law students, lawyers, and legal academics an area of study
that will be tolerated only as long as it remains an elective adorn-
ment.86 One could hope that the heyoka methodology might for a
moment stop the world.3 7
30. Hughes, supra note 10, at 429.
31. Id. at 430.
32. Stevens, American Legal Scholarship: Structural Constraints and Intel-
lectual Conceptualism, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 442 (1983).
33. Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. LE-
GAL EDUC. 591 (1982). ". . . [O]ne might as well declare openly that all new ideas
are taboo, as require that they be examined, evaluated, and approved by some
heirarchy of officials and bureaucrats. . . ." Lonergan, supra note 18, at 234.
34. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LE-
GAL EDUC. 247 (1978).
35. "You have used your energies, which might well have been better spent
thinking about academic issues-or even legal scholarship-to prop up the fre-
quently narrow-minded and sometimes bigoted views of the practicing profes-
sion." Stevens, supra note 32, at 444.
36. Hughes, supra note 10, at 426.
37. "We need to develop a body of legal writing which contemplates deep
1984]
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Why would John Ignatius O'Flynn, L., rejected by the law and
living as an outlaw spend his time writing plays on legal themes?
Perhaps Professor Kelman put his finger on it at the Plenary Ses-
sion when he described a type of policy analysis prevalent in to-
day's law schools as "Law Day homilies.""8
Yet, he found these homilies to be informed by a "genuinely
moving Utopianism."3 9 Certainly, the law written large in the spirit
is infused with Utopian vision and once having been remembered
it is hard to forget.40
If this reviewer cries for better Utopias4 1 in the story telling of
Jurisfiction, it is because the promise of insight is so great with the
fools method.4 2 How has it been imagined; is imagined, and might
be imagined that one may do for the one and for the whole? How
might freedom and solidarity manifest themselves as inseparable
yet distinct? How might the story be the practical cure to the long-
run bias of common sense?
Professor McQuade has given legal education and perhaps le-
gal scholarship the revolutionary gift of laughter. May it break the
bonds of arrogance. Professor McQuade has given the songs of
those that dreamed before us, the classical jurisprudes. May it
erase the guilt of self-suppression. "When the ceremony was over,
everybody felt a great deal better, for it had been a day of fun.
They were better able now to see the greenness of the world, the
wideness of the sacred day,,the colors of the earth, and to set these
in their minds. 4 3
changes ... " Id. at 431.
38. Kelman, The Past and Future of Legal Scholarship, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC.
432, 434 (1983).
39. Id.
40. "Anthropologists tell us that blessed isles and paradises are part of the
dreamworld of savages everywhere." F.E. MANUEL & F.P. MANUEL, UTOPIAN
THOUGHT IN THE WESTERN WORLD 1 (1979).
41. "Stripped of the rather silly and unpersuasive analogic and distinguishing
techniques that the common-law buffs are trying to bring back into vogue, schol-
arship about law, if not legal practice, is nothing but Utopian theorizing. We need
better Utopias." Kelman; supra note 38, at 436.
42. "The great utopia startles and yet is recognized as conceivable. It is not a
sleepy or bizarre vision but one that satisfies a hunger or stimulates the mind and
the body to the recognition of a new potentiality." F.E. MANUEL & F.P. MANUEL,
supra note 40, at 29.
43. J. NEIHARDT, supra note 14, at 197.
[Vol. 6:219226
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